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Jane Fisher and Lyn Chitty highlight in BioNews 864 that it's been almost nine months since the UK 
National Screening Committee (NSC) recommended an 'evaluative implementation of NIPT into the 
NHS's antenatal screening programme (1) – a recommendation that still awaits ministerial 
decision. The NSC have recommended the staged implementation of NIPT as a contingent screen. It 
will be offered as an additional second-line test to women who have already had the currently 
available screening test and have been found to have a probability of greater than 1 in 150 of giving 
birth to a child with trisomy 13, 18 or 21. 
In the constraints of a publicly funded healthcare system, this step-wise implementation arguably 
makes ethical as well as scientific sense when compared to a model in which NIPT replaces current 
screening. It may reduce concerns such as routinisation of screening, the possible loss of moral and 
temporal 'thinking space' (2), and population harm resulting from overdiagnosis in pregnant women 
(see BioNews 797). Further, the oversight of testing by a public health body may mitigate the issue 
of equity of access to testing while accurately presenting the test's positive predictive value. While 
data now supports the use of NIPT in women from a range of risk backgrounds, it remains an 
'advanced screening test' and is not yet diagnostic (3). 
This pragmatic and measured approach to the introduction of NIPT into a publicly funded healthcare 
setting is laudable, but ethical issues inevitably remain. Two particular aspects of the 
implementation of NIPT require further deliberation: (i) the ongoing prevalence of information-
driven conceptions of reproductive autonomy; and (ii) the need to include a richer and more 
nuanced account of disability. I'll consider each in turn.  
First, the claim we should provide appropriate information to promote autonomy in women 
considering NIPT is intuitive. Fisher and Chitty, for example, assert that: 'A central tenet of prenatal 
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testing is to promote reproductive autonomy by providing women with information that can assist in 
pregnancy management.1 
However, information has a more complex bearing on autonomy than we might initially assume, as 
Hildt argues in the context of predictive genetic testing (4). Philosophers have played down direct 
correlations between information and autonomy, or information and consent (5). Providing 
information alone cannot facilitate reproductive autonomy, and taking a maximisation approach to 
information and choice could cause harm. Instead of relying on information-driven conceptions of 
autonomy, facilitating authentic reproductive autonomy is more complex. This involves 
acknowledging relational aspects (namely that our decisions are influenced by our social context and 
relationships with others) and encouraging self-reflection to act in accordance with broader life 
goals. It will be important to build opportunities to undertake such reflection into the roll-out of 
NIPT. 
My second concern relates to conceptions of disability in prenatal testing. There has long been a 
polarised debate over whether testing in pregnancy properly accounts for disability. This tends to 
manifest as an impasse between disability advocates and test advocates. Disability advocates voice 
concerns about the disappearance of the conditions screened for. Test advocates have a tendency to 
frame disability medically, using terms such as 'suffering' and 'difficulties'. 
While one practical way to approach this issue is to ensure any chromosomal condition is framed in 
a balanced way when discussing screening, this is not sufficient. Academics active in this area 
emphasise that we should be wary of thinking of disability as one entity or of ignoring its subjective, 
experiential aspects. We require richer and more complex deliberations on difference, opportunity 
and belonging. We need to pay attention to language and move away from solely individualised 
notions of disability to one that also encompasses shared experience and vulnerability. 
The implementation and evaluation of a staged rollout of NIPT offers an unprecedented opportunity 
for quality and in-depth deliberation on concepts such as reproductive autonomy and disability. 
Stakeholders in NIPT should aim to avoid speaking past each other, particularly given the importance 
of conversations on whether, how or why it is appropriate to make choices that impact the children 
we have. 
 
SOURCES & REFERENCES 
1) The UK NSC recommendation on Fetal anomaly screening in pregnancy  
Current UK NSC recommendations | 01 January 2016 
  
2) Scully J, Porz R, Rehmann-Sutter C. 'You don't make genetic test decisions from one day 
to the next - using time to preserve moral space' 
Bioethics 2(14): 208-217. | 14 March 2007 
  
                                                          
1
 I acknowledge Dr Lisa Dive and Associate Professor Catherine Mills. Dr Dive’s ongoing work on autonomy in 
bioethics (as part of an MPhil at the University of Sydney) has informed my thinking on this topic. Associate 
Professor Mills recently convened a roundtable on disability and reproductive choice at Monash University. My 
role as commentator at this event allowed me the opportunity to assemble the thoughts I have provided in 
this Commentary.   
 
3 | P a g e  
 
3) Benn P, Chapman AR. 'Ethical and practical challenges in providing noninvasive prenatal 
testing for chromosome abnormalities: an update'  
Current Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynaecology 28:119-124 | 01 April 2016 
  
4) Hildt, E. 'Predictive Genetic Testing, Autonomy and Responsibility for Future Health' 
Medicine Studies 1(2), 143-153. | 21 April 2009 
  
5) O'Neill, O. 'Some limits of informed consent'  
Journal of Medical Ethics 29(1): 4-7. | 23 September 2002 
 
